SEBI investigated the activities of Kamalai, an individual stock trader. During the investigation, it was found that Kamalai was putting orders, ahead of orders placed by Pointed Ltd. Vimalai, was the portfolio manager o

CS Professional · Resolution of Corporate Disputes, Non-Compliances & Remedies · PYQS · June 2024
SEBI investigated the activities of Kamalai, an individual stock trader. During the investigation, it was found that Kamalai was putting orders, ahead of orders placed by Pointed Ltd. Vimalai, was the portfolio manager of Pointed Ltd., who also happens to be a cousin of Kamalai and Tharen. It was alleged that Vimalai provided information to Kamalai and Tharen regarding forthcoming trading activity of the Pointed Ltd. These trades were executed using the telephone number registered in the name of Tharen, at the common residential address of Vimalai and Tharen. Taking advantage of the information received from Vimalai, Kamalai had indulged in trading before the Pointed Ltd and consequently squared off the position when the order of Pointed Ltd were placed in the market. It was estimated that Kamalai earned a total profit of ₹ 1.5 crores from the alleged trades. Despite the evidence on record, Kamalai pleaded that it was a coincidence. With reference to a judicial pronouncement, comment if SEBI's action is justified.

Answer & Explanation:

The facts of the given situation is similar to the case of Securities and Exchange Board of India (Appellant) v. Shri Kanaiyalal Baldevbhai Patel (Respondent) dated 20th September, 2017 decided by the Supreme Court of India. This case revolves round the legality of non-intermediary 'front running' in security market under the Securities and Exchange Board of India (Prohibition of Fraudulent and Unfair Trade Practices Relating to Securities Market) Regulations, 2003 (FUTP 2003). Facts of the case: SEBI investigated into the activities of Shri Kanaiyalal Baldevbhai Patel [herein after 'KB' for brevity] an individual trader. During the investigation, it was found that KB was putting orders ahead of orders placed by Passport India Investment (Mauritius) Ltd. [herein after 'PII' for brevity]. One Dipak Patel, was the portfolio manager of PII, who also happens to be a cousin of KB and one Shri Anandkumar Baldevbhai Patel [herein after 'AB' for brevity]. It was alleged that Dipak Patel provided information to KB and AB regarding forthcoming trading activity of the PII. It is to be noted that trades were executed using the telephone number registered in the name of AB at the common residential address of KB and AB. Taking advantage of the information received from Dipak Patel, KB had indulged in trading before the PII and consequently squared off the position when the order of PII were placed in the market. It was estimated that the KB earned a total profit of ₹ 1,56,32,364.01/- from the alleged trades. Decision: The object and purpose of FUTP 2003 is to curb "market manipulations". Market manipulation is normally regarded as an "unwarranted" interference in the operation of ordinary market forces of supply and demand and thus undermines the "integrity" and efficiency of the market. The law of confidentiality has a bearing on this case instant. "Confidential information acquired or compiled by a corporation in the course and conduct of its business is a species of property to which the corporation has the exclusive right and benefit, and which a court of equity will protect through the injunctive process or other appropriate remedy." The information of possible trades that the company is going to undertake is the confidential information of the company concerned, which it has absolute liberty to deal with. Therefore, a person conveying confidential information to another person (tippee) breaches his duty prescribed by law and if the recipient of such information knows of the breach and trades, and there is an inducement to bring about an inequitable result, then the recipient tippee may be said to have committed the fraud. In order to establish charges against tippee, under regulations 3 (a), (b), (c) and (d) and 4 (1) of FUTP 2003, one needs to prove that a person who had provided the tip was under a duty to keep the non-public information under confidence, further such breach of duty was known to the tippee and he still trades thereby defrauding the person, whose orders were front-runner, by inducing him to deal at the price he did. In view of the above case, it can be said that concerned parties to the transaction were involved in an apparent fraudulent practice violating market integrity. The parting of information with regard to an imminent bulk purchase and the subsequent transaction thereto are so intrinsically connected that no other conclusion but one of joint liability of both the initiator of the fraudulent practice and the other party who had knowingly aided in the same is possible. SEBI may accordingly take action against the parties to the transaction.

Topics: SEBI Act, 1992

Open in Interactive Practice Hub · Full Practice Hub · Chapter Weightage · More in this subject

Related Questions in this Topic