In a case, the learned Arbitrator reserved his Arbitral Award on 28th July 2012 but pronounced it only on 16th March 2016, i.e., nearly three years and eight months later, with no definite resolution of the matter. Signi

The appropriate position of law in the given circumstances can be understood from the decision of the case M/s Lancor Holdings Limited v. Prem Kumar Menon & Ors. decided by Supreme Court on 31st October, 2025. In this case, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that delay in the delivery of an arbitral award, by itself, is not sufficient to set aside that award. However, each such case would have to be examined on its own individual facts to ascertain whether that delay had an adverse impact on the final decision of the arbitral tribunal, whereby that award would stand vitiated due to the lapses committed by the arbitral tribunal owing to such delay. It is only when the effect of the undue delay in the delivery of an arbitral award is explicit and adversely reflects on the findings therein, such delay and, more so, if it remains unexplained, can be construed to result in the award being in conflict with the public policy of India, thereby attracting Section 34(2)(b)(ii) of the Act of 1996 or Section 34(2A) thereof, as it may also be vitiated by patent illegality. Further, it would not be necessary for an aggrieved party to invoke the remedy under Section 14(2) of the Act of 1996 as a condition precedent to lay a challenge to that delayed and tainted award under Section 34 thereof. The basis and public policy underlying the process of arbitration is that it is less time-consuming and results in speedier resolution of disputes between the parties. The Court held that if that premise is not fulfilled by an unworkable arbitral award that does not resolve the disputes between the parties, on one hand, leaving them with no choice but to initiate a fresh round of arbitration/litigation but the arbitrator, in the meanwhile, also changed their positions, irrevocably altering the pre-existing balance between the parties prior to the arbitration, then such an arbitral award would not only be in conflict with the public policy of India but would also be patently illegal on the face of it. It would therefore be liable to be set aside under Section 34(2)(b)(ii) and/or Section 34(2A) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. It was also held that where the conditions for exercise of power under Article 142 of the Constitution are satisfied, such jurisdiction may be justifiably exercised in accordance with the principles laid down in Gayatri Balasamy v. ISG Novasoft Technologies Limited .