Canara Bank had made an application before the CLB seeking relief against the Nuclear Power Corporation of Indian Ltd. which had refused in its books in the name of the Canara Bank bonds of the Nuclear Power Corporation

In the present case, the issue is whether an application filed by Canara Bank before Company Law Board (CLB) seeking relief against Nuclear Power Corporation of India Ltd. (NPCIL) in relation to refusal to recognise in the name of Canara Bank bonds of NPCIL purchased by Canara Bank stood transferred to the Special Court in view of section 9A(2) of the Special Courts Act as amended by the Special Court (Trial of Offences Relating to Transactions in Securities) Amendment Ordinance, 1994. In the case of Canara Bank vs. Nuclear Power Corporation of India Ltd & Ors (1995 SCC, Supl. (3) 81) , Hon'ble Supreme Court of India looked into the scope of Section 9A(1)(b) read with 9A(2) as introduced by Special Court (Trial of Offences Relating to Transactions in Securities) Amendment Ordinance, 1994. In the above case, Supreme Court noted the relevant Section 9A(1) which provided that "On and from the commencement of the Special Court (Trial Offences Relating to Transactions in Securities) Amendment Ordinance, 1994, the Special Court shall exercise all such jurisdiction, powers and authority as were exercisable, immediately before such commencement, by any civil court in relation to any matter of claim ....." Supreme Court also noted the relevant Section 9A(2) which provided that "Every suit, claim or other legal proceedings (other than on appeal) pending before any court immediately before the commencement of the Special Court (Trial of Offences Relating to Transactions in Securities) Amendment Ordinance, 1994, being a suit claim or proceeding, the cause of action whereon it is based is such that it would have been, if it had arisen after such commencement, within the jurisdiction of the Special Court under sub-section (1). shall stand transferred on such commencement to the Special Court and the Special Court may, on receipt of the records of such suit, claim or other legal proceeding, proceed to deal with it, so far as may be, in the same manner as a suit, claim or legal proceeding from the stage which was reached before such transfer or from any earlier stage of de novo as the Special Court may deem fit." In the aforesaid case, Hon'ble Supreme Court looked into the issue of whether the use of the words 'civil court' in subsection (1) excludes the application of Section 9A to the CLB? For the purposes of deciding the aforesaid issue, Hon'ble Supreme Court noted that "The question to pose, therefore, is: is the CLB a court. If it is, it is divested of the jurisdiction, powers and authority to entertain matters or claims arising out of transactions in securities entered into between the stated dates in which a notified person is involved, by reason of sub-section (3); and, by reason of sub-section (2), such matters or claims pending before it on the commencement of the Amendment Ordinance stand transferred to the Special Court." Thereafter for the purposes of ascertaining "what are courts and tribunals", Supreme Court took note of the leading decision by the Constitution Bench of Hon'ble Supreme Court in M/s. Harinagar Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Shyam Sundar Jhunjhuwala and Ors., (1962) 2 S.C.R. 339 wherein Supreme Court held that "The authority of the Central Government to entertain an appeal under Section 111 was an investiture of the judicial power of the State. As the dispute between the parties related to civil rights and the Companies Act provided for a right of appeal and made detailed provisions about hearing and disposal according to law. It was impossible to avoid the inference that a duty was imposed upon the Central Government in deciding the appeal to act judicially." Further, it was observed that "all tribunals were no courts though all courts were tribunals. The word "courts" was used to designate those tribunals which were set up in an organised State for the administration of justice. By administration of justice was meant the exercise of the judicial power of the State to maintain and uphold rights and to punish wrongs." Hon'ble Supreme Court also took note of the functions of the Central Government under section 111 of the Companies Act which were akin to exercise of judicial power. In this regard, Supreme Court noted that "The Central Government was also empowered to include in its orders directions as to payment of costs or otherwise. The function of the Central Government was curial and not executive. There was provision for a hearing and a decision on evidence, and that was indubitably a curial function. In its functions the Central Government often reached decisions but all its decisions could not be regarded as those of a tribunal. Resolutions of Government might affect rights of parties and yet they might not be in the exercise of judicial power. Resolutions of Government might be amenable to writs under Articles 32 and 226 in appropriate cases but might not be subject to a direct appeal under Article 136 as the decisions of a tribunal. The position, however, changed when Government embarked upon curial functions and proceeded to exercise judicial power and decide disputes. In these circumstances, it was legitimate to regard the officer who dealt with the matter and even Government itself as a tribunal. The word "tribunal" was a word of wide import and the words "court" and "tribunal" embraced within them the exercise of judicial power in all its forms. The decision of the Central Government thus fell within the powers of the Supreme Court under Article 136." For the purposes of determining the issue in hand in the context of Special Court (Trial of Offences Relating to Transactions in Securities) Amendment Ordinance, 1994, Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the word "court" must be read in the context in which it is used in a statute. "It is permissible, given the context, to read it as comprehending the courts of civil judicature and courts or some tribunals exercising curial, or judicial, powers. In the context in which the word "court" is used in Section 9A of the Special Court Act, it is intended to encompass all curial or judicial bodies which have the jurisdiction to decide matters or claims, inter alia, arising out of transactions in securities entered into between the stated dates in which a person notified is involved." Supreme Court also held that it is proper to attribute to the word "court" in Section 9A(1) of the Special Court Act, not the narrower meaning of a court of civil judicature which is part of the ordinary hierarchy of courts, but the broader meaning of a curial body, a body acting judicially to deal with matters and claims arising out of transactions in securities entered into between the stated dates in which a person notified is involved. An interpretation that suppresses the mischief and advances the remedy must, plainly, be given. Accordingly, Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the application of the Canara Bank pending before the CLB shall stand transferred to the Special Court constituted under the provisions of the Special Court (Trial of Offences Relating to Transactions in Securities) Act, 1992. In view of the aforesaid judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, it is clear that the CLB will not have jurisdiction to decide the application filed by Canara Bank seeking relief against Nuclear Power Corporation of India Ltd. and the pending application before CLB will stand transferred to the Special Court constituted under Special Court Act. Hence, the stand of the Canara Bank and Nuclear Power Corporation that the application of the Canara Bank stood transferred to the Special Court by virtue of the provisions of section 9A(2) of the Special Courts Act is correct and CLB has no jurisdiction.