Discuss in brief the applicability and non-applicability of the doctrine of sufficient cause under section 5 of The Limitation Act, 1963.

Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 (Limitation Act) allows the extension of prescribed period in certain cases on sufficient cause being shown for the delay. This is known as doctrine of "sufficient cause" for condonation of delay which is embodied in Section 5 of the Limitation Act. Applicability Section 5 provides that any appeal or any application, other than an application under any of the provisions of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, may be admitted after the prescribed period if the appellant or the applicant satisfies the court that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal or making the application within such period. It is clarified by the explanation appended to Section 5 that the fact that the appellant or applicant was misled by any order, practice or judgement of the High Court in ascertaining or computing the prescribed period may be a sufficient cause within the meaning of this section. The prescribed period means any period prescribed by any law for the time being in force. Non-applicability Section 5 is not applicable to applications made under any of the provisions of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 and also to suits. The Court has no power to admit a time barred suit even if there is a sufficient cause for the delay. It applies only to appeals or applications as specified therein. The reason for non-applicability of the Section to suits is that, the period of limitation allowed in most of the suits extends from 3 to 12 years whereas in appeals and application it does not exceed 6 months. For the applicability of Section 5, the "prescribed period" should be over. The party applying for condonation of delay should satisfy the Court for not making an appeal or application within the prescribed period for sufficient cause. The term sufficient cause has not been defined in the Limitation Act. It depends on the circumstances of each case. However, it must be a cause which is beyond the control of the party. In Ramlal v. Rewa Coal Fields Ltd., AIR 1962 SC 361 , the Supreme Court held that once the period of limitation expires then the appellant has to explain the delay made thereafter for day by day and if he is unable to explain the delay even for a single day, it would be deemed that the party did not have sufficient cause for delay. It is the Court's discretion to extend or not to extend the period of limitation even after the sufficient cause has been shown and other conditions are also specified. However, the Court should exercise its discretion judicially and not arbitrarily.